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FEDERALISM AT STEP ZERO 
Miriam Seifter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Given the extensive interconnections between state and federal actors and 
laws in the administrative sphere, it should be no surprise that 
administrative law cases—cases often involving the application of 
Chevron—frequently raise federalism questions.1  States are deeply 
intertwined in the development and implementation of federal regulation.2  
Federal rules and policies affect states in myriad ways, including by 
preempting state law, by burdening state coffers, and by limiting state 
administrators‘ discretion and flexibility through the imposition of federal 
standards.3 
What should courts do when the worlds of Chevron and federalism 
collide?  This is among the ―second-generation‖4 Chevron questions that 
merit attention as we look back at Chevron‘s first thirty years and ahead to 
its future.5  The U.S. Supreme Court has at times indicated—repeatedly, but 
not consistently—that Chevron does not apply in certain federalism cases, 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; Visiting Researcher, 
Georgetown University Law Center, 2012–2014.  I am grateful to my fellow participants in 
the Fordham Law Review‘s Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward 
Symposium for helpful comments and conversations. 
 
 1. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); Cuomo v. Clearing 
House Ass‘n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519 (2009); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 329–30 (2008); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 
(2007); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 
735 (1996); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 57 
DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008) (identifying cases); cf. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and 
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 202–03 
(―[I]ncreasingly, Chevron is being applied confusingly to interpretations of statutes that 
allocate interpretive authority . . . to a mix of federal and state institutions.‖). 
 2. See Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 446–47 
(2014). 
 3. For discussions of the many ways in which states interact with and are affected by 
the federal regulatory process, see, for example, DANIEL ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM:  A 
VIEW FROM THE STATES (2d ed. 1972); JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM 
(2009); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994). 
 4. Gersen, supra note 1, at 247 (referring to the allocation of authority between state 
and federal governments as a ―second-generation question[]‖ that ―require[s] more nuanced 
analysis of politics and policy‖ than first-generation Chevron problems of ―courts versus 
agencies‖). 
 5. For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, 
Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 
(2014). 
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or does not apply in its usual way.6  Several scholars have embraced these 
indications and have argued that Chevron should yield to federalism norms, 
at least in certain contexts.7  Because these proposals all require analysis 
before the Chevron framework is deployed, I refer to them collectively as a 
―Federalism Step Zero.‖8  This Essay identifies Federalism Step Zero as a 
distinct concept, analyzes its underpinnings and mechanics, and ultimately, 
argues against its adoption. 
To date, Federalism Step Zero proposals have lacked much unified 
treatment.  A few scholars have considered explicitly whether the Supreme 
Court should—or already does—apply a special Step Zero test in cases that 
implicate federalism.9  Professor Rick Hills, for example, has urged that an 
agency should never be eligible for Chevron deference when interpreting a 
statute that also allocates authority to subnational actors.10  But most 
attention has focused on distinct slices of the Federalism Step Zero question 
or has considered the question only obliquely.  The most extensive dialogue 
has considered the sub-issue of whether or how Chevron should apply in 
preemption cases.11  Though not usually phrased in Step Zero language, this 
debate contemplates an antecedent step that would remove preemption 
cases from Chevron analysis, substituting Skidmore12 or de novo review.  
 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. For an overview of Step Zero, see infra Part I. 
 9. See Gersen, supra note 1 (describing the use of federalism at Step Zero in Gonzales 
v. Oregon); Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal 
Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 50 (2008) (observing that the Gonzales 
Court ―infused federalism concerns into Chevron Step Zero‖ but arguing that Step Zero 
provides insufficient protection for federalism values). 
 10. See Rick Hills, How Did Scalia’s Anti-Federalism Bluster in City of Arlington v. 
FCC Go Unnoticed by Six Justices?, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 24, 2013, 11:35 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/05/scalias-odd-view-of-federalism-in-city-
of-arlington-v-fcc.html (―[A]t the very least, the Court should not put its finger on the scale 
in favor of the agency when the relevant statutory language clearly anticipates a division of 
authority between two potentially rival governmental actors.‖). 
 11. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1441, 1471 (2008) (arguing that courts should require a clear, targeted 
statement from Congress to empower an agency to preempt state law); Nina A. Mendelson, 
Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 742 (2004) (arguing that Chevron should 
not apply to agency interpretations of a statute‘s preemptive effect); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 730 (2008) (arguing that 
―courts should develop a preemption-specific doctrine for considering agency views about 
preemption that focuses on the pragmatic dimensions of preemption controversies and seeks 
to encourage agencies to permit public participation in proceedings that implicate 
preemption‖); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000) 
(stating that congressional rather than agency resolution of preemption questions is 
―important‖ given the safeguards in Congress against ―cavalier disregard of state interests‖); 
Damien J. Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Preemption 
Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263, 278 (1998) (arguing that Chevron should not apply in regulatory 
preemption cases because, inter alia, agencies lack sufficient expertise and accountability); 
cf. The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading Cases, Preemption of State Common Law 
Claims, 123 HARV. L. REV. 262, 271 (2009) [hereinafter Preemption of State Common Law 
Claims] (arguing that preemption cases should be decided within the Chevron framework, in 
part because Step Zero will filter out cases undeserving of deference). 
 12. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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Scholars writing at the intersection of administrative law and federalism 
have questioned whether Chevron analysis and other deference doctrines 
could be altered in federalism cases to better protect state interests, 
implicating but not focusing on Step Zero questions.13  And as noted, a 
number of judicial decisions have intimated favor for a Federalism Step 
Zero, albeit without consistency or doctrinal clarity.14  All of these 
dispersed contributions share a common aim of altering Chevron‘s 
application in the federalism context. 
A unified treatment of Federalism Step Zero is timely.  Recent, 
heightened lamentations about the excess of the federal bureaucracy and the 
need to restrain federal agencies from trampling on states call the Chevron-
federalism intersection squarely into question.15  Neither the outsized role 
of federal regulatory policy nor the intertwining of federal regulation and 
state functions is likely to retreat.  This is the era of administrative 
federalism,16 and evaluation of federalism‘s intersection with Chevron is 
therefore vital. 
This Essay offers a fresh approach to the Chevron-federalism quandary, 
focusing on the mismatch between the nature of Step Zero and the nature of 
federalism analysis in the administrative context.  Step Zero is best served 
by a rule rather than a standard, a lesson evident in the aftermath of United 
States v. Mead Corp.17 and apparently part of the doctrine after City of 
Arlington v. FCC.18  But the heterogeneity of questions and goals at stake in 
administrative federalism cases makes bright lines a poor fit.  No rule can 
identify accurately when agencies should answer federalism questions—and 
because agencies are well-positioned to resolve many such questions, there 
is no reason to believe that categorically denying deference would better 
serve federalism goals.  Moreover, courts can already police bad agency 
 
 13. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:  Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 256–57 (2007) (suggesting that an 
agency‘s compliance with the Federalism Executive Order could be treated as a prerequisite 
for judicial deference to agency decisions in federalism cases); Ernest A. Young, Executive 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 883, 891 (2008) (proposing that compliance with the 
Federalism Executive Order could be a variable in determining whether to defer to agencies 
under Skidmore in preemption cases); see also Metzger, supra note 1, at 2105 (suggesting 
that agencies should face a higher burden of persuasion when substantially infringing on 
state prerogatives). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) 
(describing the EPA‘s interpretation of the statute, in part, as ―laying claim to extravagant 
statutory power over the national economy‖). 
 16. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 1, at 2027 (suggesting that ―administrative law may be 
becoming the home of a new federalism‖). 
 17. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 18. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); see infra Part I.  A number of other contributions to this 
symposium consider Chevron Step Zero and the effect of City of Arlington. See Jack M. 
Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court:  Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 731, 741–43 (2014); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 527, 528–30 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 556–58 (2014); Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 792–93 (2014). 
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interpretations through Chevron analysis and arbitrary and capricious 
review.  A Federalism Step Zero would thus needlessly harm the coherence 
and predictability of the Chevron framework. 
First, a Federalism Step Zero is unlikely to serve federalism goals better 
than ordinary Chevron analysis and arbitrary and capricious review.  The 
idea behind existing Federalism Step Zero proposals tends to be that 
federalism is too important to leave in the hands of administrative agencies, 
which might lack the expertise or incentives to protect the federal balance 
of power.19  But this oversimplifies, as others have recognized.  Nearly all 
federalism cases in the administrative context involve factual or policy 
analysis at which courts and scholars generally presume agencies are 
superior,20 and these components are impossible to separate neatly from 
purely legal questions.21  Moreover, federalism is a shorthand for multiple, 
often conflicting goals:  scholars and courts seek not only to protect state 
power but also to channel state expertise in national decision making and to 
honor the democratic will of state polities.22  Agencies often are equipped 
and disposed to contribute to these goals.  Accordingly, neither the 
existence of federalism implications nor an agency‘s competence to 
evaluate them can be readily parsed by a Step Zero rule.  Unlike, say, the 
question whether an agency is exercising delegated power to make rules or 
adjudicate,23 a Federalism Step Zero would demand detailed, holistic 
analysis.  Attempts to abstract a federalism ―test‖ for Chevron eligibility 
would produce inaccuracies, rendering agencies ineligible for deference 
when they are in fact well-positioned to respond to diverse inquiries and 
goals bound up with federalism.  The upshot is necessarily inexact,24 but 
there is no reason to believe a Federalism Step Zero would produce a net 
benefit for federalism goals. 
Nor is switching the default deference presumption to Skidmore or de 
novo review through a Federalism Step Zero a low-cost modification.  One 
of Chevron‘s salient features is the simplicity of an overarching 
presumption that agencies interpret statutory ambiguities, subject to limits 
of reasonableness.25  Expansions of Step Zero, federalism or otherwise, 
 
 19. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 1, at 232–35 (canvassing ―standard‖ arguments against 
giving Chevron deference to agency interpretations regarding preemption). 
 20. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “with Teeth”:  Heightened Judicial 
Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 107 (forthcoming 
2014) (stating that ―a (if not the) significant factor governing an agency‘s determination that 
state law interferes with the federal regulatory scheme is the burden or cost (net of the 
corresponding benefit) of such state regulation on the federal scheme,‖ and that in 
preemption cases, ―agency action is (or, I argue, should be) premised on an empirical or 
factual substrate of information‖). 
 21. See Merrill, supra note 11, at 773. 
 22. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, States As Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 
100 VA. L. REV. 953 (2014). 
 23. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (discussing City of Arlington). 
 24. After all, there is no plausible quantification of what share of federalism questions 
would be better decided by agencies or how much better agencies would be at deciding such 
questions. 
 25. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:  Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 347, 348 (2003). 
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chip away at that presumption, making the deference regime less coherent 
and predictable.26  The more exceptions that are added to Step Zero, the 
more the Chevron doctrine seems to crumble. 
These costs are unnecessary.  Federalism values can be considered 
effectively, and with fewer negative consequences, in the more 
encompassing reasonableness analysis that courts perform in the ordinary 
two steps of the Chevron framework, and in arbitrary and capricious 
review.27  Those phases of review allow courts to assess federalism 
questions in their applied context and consider multiple federalism-related 
values that may be at issue.  Chevron‘s interior steps and arbitrary and 
capricious review also empower courts to reject unreasonable agency 
decisions, including those that misconceive or disregard federalism 
implications.  To the extent that federalism is implicated in Chevron cases, 
these established phases of review are where any consideration of 
federalism values should occur.28 
Part I of the Essay offers a brief overview of Step Zero, sketching its 
genesis, highlighting the need to keep the inquiry simple and clear, and 
identifying City of Arlington‘s progress toward a clear rule.  Part II shows 
that a variety of existing proposals belong under the rubric of a Federalism 
Step Zero and teases out their normative and practical facets.  Although the 
Essay ultimately concludes that a Federalism Step Zero is both unnecessary 
and unwise, the project of recognizing a Federalism Step Zero as a distinct 
concept, analyzing its normative and logical underpinnings, and exploring 
its potential mechanics should be valuable even to those who disagree with 
the bottom line. 
Part III argues that federalism analysis at Step Zero is bad for the 
Chevron framework and unlikely to achieve its proponents‘ goals.  To 
develop this argument, I identify three possible forms a Federalism Step 
Zero inquiry might take—inquiries based on the category of legal question 
presented (e.g., preemption), the agency‘s procedures, or the subject area at 
issue—and explain why none is workable.  I then explain why federalism 
goals could be more effectively addressed, with fewer costs, within the 
flexible confines of the Chevron two-step and in arbitrary and capricious 
review. 
Although the focus here is on the symposium‘s honoree, the Chevron 
doctrine itself, this Essay also suggests a deeper, generalizable point about 
 
 26. A Federalism Step Zero shares common ground with other proposed exceptions to 
Chevron‘s application, though analysis of those proposals is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 27. As discussed in Part III, this Essay does not take a position on current debates 
regarding whether Steps One and Two of Chevron are redundant, either with each other or 
with arbitrary and capricious review.  It suffices here that, both within Chevron and in 
arbitrary and capricious review, courts have authority to review the reasonableness of agency 
decisions, taking many factors into account. 
 28. My criticism does not preclude the application of the ―federalism canons‖ of 
statutory interpretation at Step One (or Step Two), though as I explain in Part III, some of 
the flaws of a Federalism Step Zero also counsel against heavy reliance on federalism 
canons. 
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administrative federalism.  Federalism inquiries and values tend to be 
multifaceted and nuanced in ways that make them poor fits for the more 
formalistic, rule-bound features of administrative law.  Attention to 
federalism requires the use of standards, in Chevron analysis and beyond it. 
I.   THE NEED FOR—AND ARRIVAL OF—A SIMPLE STEP ZERO 
To understand why federalism should not be a factor at Step Zero, it is 
first necessary to see the importance of a clear, rule-based Step Zero 
inquiry.  This requires a bit of background about Step Zero‘s evolution. 
The ―Step Zero‖ moniker was coined in an influential 2001 article by two 
participants in this symposium, Professors Thomas Merrill and Kristin 
Hickman.29  The term describes the antecedent question a court must ask 
before proceeding with Chevron‘s two steps:  Does Chevron apply at all to 
the particular statute or agency interpretation at issue?30  In several 
decisions beginning in 2000, the Supreme Court began developing a Step 
Zero doctrine to answer that question.  (Indeed, some Justices have now 
even adopted the Step Zero terminology.31)  But an early trilogy of Step 
Zero decisions left the required inquiry unclear. 
The trilogy‘s key case, Mead, provided a confounding explanation of the 
appropriate analysis.  The Court appeared to establish a rule that agency 
interpretations were Chevron-eligible only if they were made pursuant to 
delegated authority to act with ―the force of law.‖32  But the Court left 
unclear the meaning of ―the force of law,‖ whether it was a distinct test or 
part of a more encompassing evaluation of the agency‘s action, and how it 
related to the agency‘s use of formal or informal procedures.33  In 
particular, the Court indicated that an agency‘s use of formal procedures 
was a ―very good indicator‖ of congressional delegation to act with the 
force of law, but the Court did not explain when informal procedures might 
suffice.34  Mead‘s ambiguity was compounded by mixed signals in two 
Step Zero cases decided in the prior and subsequent years, Christensen v. 
Harris County,35 which emphasized the importance of formal procedures,36 
 
 29. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 
(2001).  Professor Merrill‘s contribution to this symposium traces the doctrine‘s historical 
development. See Merrill, supra note 18. 
 30. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 29, at 835; see also Gersen, supra note 1, at 217. 
 31. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, 8, 25, 27–28, City of Arlington v. FCC, 
133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11-1545). 
 32. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
 33. See Hickman, supra note 18, at 529 (―After initially articulating a relatively rule-like 
two-part test for determining the scope of Chevron‘s applicability, the Mead Court waffled 
over which agency actions would or would not satisfy that test . . . .‖). 
 34. Justice Breyer has added another wrinkle, suggesting that an agency may not always 
act with the force of law even when it does use formal procedures. See Nat‘l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 35. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 36. Id. at 587. 
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and Barnhart v. Walton,37 which seemed to embrace a multifactor analysis 
of the statutory background and the agency‘s conduct.38 
This trilogy of cases left lower courts and commentators confused about 
the status and content of Step Zero, and prompted an abundance of critical 
commentary.39  Step Zero became so confounding that it could scarcely be 
applied.  Befuddled lower courts adopted a practice of ―Chevron 
avoidance.‖40  The doctrine‘s vagueness also allowed Step Zero to be 
malleable, serving ―as a placeholder for a range of judicial concerns,‖41 and 
allowed interpretive authority to be shifted from agencies to courts.42  Thus, 
some commentators lamented, the broad, vague Step Zero unnecessarily 
undermined salutary application of the Chevron framework.43  A lesson 
emerged in Mead‘s wake:  Step Zero is a doctrinal step better served by a 
clear rule.44 
Prioritizing clarity at Step Zero is arguably in some tension with Mead‘s 
delegation-based justification for Chevron.  As Professor Abbe Gluck‘s 
contribution to this symposium observes, Mead seeks to be realistic about, 
and in tune with, how Congress actually delegates.45  But there is no 
requirement that the test for congressional intent be as complex as 
congressional intent itself, or that it take the form of a standard rather than a 
rule.46  Plunging down the rabbit hole of congressional intent produces 
numerous costs and consequences.  That may be why Mead itself, despite 
 
 37. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 38. Id. at 222 (―[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the 
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of 
that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a 
long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through 
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.‖). 
 39. See Vermeule, supra note 25, at 349 (―Mead‘s ambitious recasting of deference law 
has gone badly awry.‖); see also Lisa Schulz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial 
Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1475 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron 
Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 248 (2006).  Many other commentators have remarked on the 
deluge of criticism leveled at Mead. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 993–94 (2013) (characterizing 
Mead as ―the doctrine among the administrative law canons subject to the most vociferous 
criticism‖ and noting that the decision has ―struggled for any ground to justify the layer of 
doctrinal complexity that it imposes‖). 
 40. Bressman, supra note 39, at 1446. 
 41. Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 440 (2012). 
 42. See Gersen, supra note 1, at 239 (describing a directional shift in the ―global 
presumption in favor of judicial deference to agencies‖). 
 43. See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 194. 
 44. For commentary embracing a clear or rule-based Step Zero, see, for example, id.; 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine:  Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-
Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 819 (2002). 
 45. See Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory 
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 623–25 (2014). 
 46. See Vermeule, supra note 25, at 356. 
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professing a desire to ―tailor deference to variety,‖47 attempted to create 
rule-based proxies for inferring delegation.48 
The Supreme Court appears to have clarified and simplified the Step 
Zero analysis in City of Arlington—at least for now—thus sanctioning the 
more limited delegation inquiry.  Justice Scalia‘s opinion for the majority 
not only rejects an exception to Chevron for ―jurisdictional‖ questions49 but 
helpfully restates the Step Zero test.  The Court embraces the basic 
requirements of Mead in a way that sounds clearer and more rule-like than 
Mead itself.  The City of Arlington test asks simply whether Congress gave 
the agency general authority to administer the statute (through a grant of 
power for rulemaking or adjudication) and whether the agency took the 
action in question in exercise of that authority.50  This two-part test takes 
the key prongs of the Mead test and strips away their complexity.  Under 
this apparent test, an agency exercising delegated rulemaking or 
adjudicative authority satisfies Step Zero.51  The Court did not mention the 
ambiguous ―force of law‖ requirement or profess a commitment to the 
variety of ways in which Congress actually intends to delegate.  Nor did the 
Court say that rulemaking or adjudication must be formal to satisfy Step 
Zero (indeed, the declaratory ruling at issue in City of Arlington was a 
species of informal adjudication, albeit one with many trappings of more 
formal procedures).  As I explain further in Part III, if this is the correct 
interpretation of Step Zero‘s current status, it is a welcome development. 
II.   IDENTIFYING A FEDERALISM STEP ZERO 
This part collects the scattered suggestions in cases and commentary that 
explicitly or implicitly propose a Federalism Step Zero and teases out their 
key facets.  It describes the goals that proponents seek to achieve and 
identifies three apparent approaches to a Federalism Step Zero solution.  
The Essay‘s next part finds these options wanting. 
Scholarly proposals for a Federalism Step Zero are rooted in several 
related normative grounds.  The general idea is that federalism questions are 
 
 47. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001). 
 48. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 25, at 356 & n.34 (noting that Mead, while adopting an 
―all-things-considered inquiry‖ and ―sneer[ing]‖ at a rule-like alternative, nonetheless ―filters 
the congressional intent inquiry through rule-like procedural categories designed to make the 
inquiry more tractable‖). 
 49. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). 
 50. See id. at 1874 (―It suffices to decide this case that the preconditions to deference 
under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with 
general authority to administer the Communications Act through rulemaking and 
adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.‖). 
 51. See id.  Professor Merrill‘s contribution to this symposium interprets Justice Scalia‘s 
opinion in the same way, but doubts its staying power, finding Chief Justice Roberts‘s 
approach more compelling. See Merrill, supra note 18, at 774–75.  Even that approach, 
which would look more thoroughly at the agency‘s organic statute to ensure that it applied to 
the agency action in question (rather than allowing a general grant of rulemaking or 
adjudicatory authority to suffice), seems an improvement from Mead. 
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important, and agencies are not the best institutions to resolve them.52  
Some scholars advancing these proposals believe that agencies are inferior 
because they are insensitive to state interests or lack opportunities to 
consider state input.53  Other scholars posit that agencies are likely as 
sensitive to state interests as Congress is, but lack the expertise to analyze 
the purely legal or constitutional questions that federalism cases may 
present.54  Still others fear that agencies have incentives to aggrandize their 
own power at states‘ expenses.55  All of these proposals presume that 
courts, which are expert in constitutional analysis, are better suited to 
analyze federalism questions.  Given these premises, the proposals seek to 
turn off Chevron where federalism is implicated, or at least to create a 
rebuttable presumption that Congress has not authorized the agency to 
interpret the ambiguity at issue. 
The scholarly proposals differ in their focus and mechanics.  I group 
them into three types:  (1) a categorical approach, triggered by agency 
preemption or some other transsubstantive subset of types of federalism 
cases; (2) a procedural approach, hinging Chevron‘s application on whether 
the agency complied with federalism-friendly procedures; and (3) a 
substantive approach, in which the application of Chevron depends on what 
statute or subject area is at issue. 
A.   The Categorical Approach  
First, a number of scholars have argued that Chevron should not apply, or 
should not apply in its usual way, when agencies interpret statutes to 
preempt state law.56  In effect, these proposals carve out one paradigmatic 
and easy to identify category of federalism cases for consideration at Step 
Zero.57  A leading proposal comes from Professor Nina Mendelson.  In her 
view, agencies lack the requisite expertise to evaluate the purely legal 
question of the appropriate balance of power between levels of government, 
may lack authority from Congress to consider federalism when interpreting 
a statute, and may sometimes have incentives to increase their own 
authority at the expense of state interests.58  She proposes that agency 
preemption determinations receive only the deference due under 
Skidmore.59  Other scholars, including Professor Catherine Sharkey, agree 
that Skidmore is the appropriate standard where agencies interpret statutes 
to preempt state law.60  Professor Merrill agrees that Skidmore is preferable 
 
 52. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 53. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 11, at 331; Marshall, supra note 11, at 277–81. 
 54. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 779. 
 55. See id. at 794–96 (discussing this possibility). 
 56. See supra notes 11, 13. 
 57. See Young, supra note 13, at 869 (―Preemption of state regulatory authority by 
national law is the central federalism issue of our time.‖). 
 58. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 779–97. 
 59. Id. at 797–98. 
 60. See Sharkey, supra note 20, at 141; Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability 
Preemption:  An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 491 (2008); see also 
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to Chevron in agency preemption cases, but argues that a still better 
solution is a preemption-specific deference doctrine that would give weight 
to some subsidiary agency conclusions but reserve other aspects of the 
preemption determination for de novo review.61  Professor Ernest Young 
has stated his unwillingness to ―jump on the Skidmore bandwagon‖ because 
―stronger medicine‖ is necessary, but he is open to a ―preemption-specific 
version of Skidmore‖ that would hold agency preemption interpretations to 
a stricter standard.62 
The categorical approach finds some support in case law, although the 
Supreme Court has been inconsistent on this point.63  While in years past, 
the Court has seemed deferential to preemptive agency determinations,64 in 
recent years, the Court has considered preemption cases outside the usual 
Chevron framework.65  The Court‘s decision in Wyeth v. Levine66 illustrates 
the latter approach, which amounts to a Federalism Step Zero.  The case 
addressed whether the FDA‘s approval of the labeling for a nausea 
medication preempted a state failure-to-warn tort claim against the 
manufacturer.  The Court indicated that it would not simply defer to an 
agency‘s legal conclusion that a federal statutory scheme preempts state 
law.  Instead, agency conclusions regarding a conflict between state law and 
federal regulations would be evaluated based on the ―agency‘s explanation 
of how state law affects the regulatory scheme.‖67  The Court explained that 
agencies have ―a unique understanding of the statutes they administer and 
an attendant ability to make informed determinations about how state 
requirements may pose an‖ obstacle to Congress‘s purposes, but they ―have 
no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by 
Congress.‖68  After Wyeth, scholars have understood preemption, as a 
 
Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1443 (arguing that, unless Congress has explicitly authorized the 
agency to preempt state law, courts should apply an ―expanded Skidmore‖ approach). 
 61. See Merrill, supra note 11, at 775–76. 
 62. Young, supra note 13, at 890–92. 
 63. See, e.g., Gregory M. Dickinson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 667, 669 (2011) (noting that in preemption cases, ―the Court continues to apply 
deference haphazardly from case to case with no clearly articulated reason for its variation‖). 
 64. Professor Sharkey notes that before Wyeth, ―[t]he Court had previously given a nod 
(if not outright deference) to agency proclamations of preemption‖ made in both regulations 
and other statements. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” 
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2180 (2009). 
 65. See Preemption of State Common Law Claims, supra note 11, at 268 (describing the 
Court‘s ―practice of withholding preemption determinations from the general Chevron 
regime‖); see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 n.3 (2011) (―Although we 
defer to the agency‘s interpretation of its regulations, we do not defer to an agency‘s ultimate 
conclusion about whether state law should be pre-empted.‖ (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 576 (2009))); cf. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 329–30 (2008) (stating 
the Court was ―neither accepting nor rejecting the proposition that this regulation can 
properly be consulted to determine the statute‘s meaning‖). 
 66. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 67. Id. at 576. 
 68. Id. at 577. 
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category, to be relevant to whether Chevron will apply—that is, relevant to 
Step Zero—even if the doctrinal rule is still murky.69 
One can imagine categories other than preemption questions that 
encompass slightly different swaths of federalism-implicating cases.  For 
example, the category might be adjusted to include all cases in which a state 
sues an agency regarding interpretation of a statute, or cases in which an 
agency interprets a statute that allocates authority to both levels of 
government.70  Or the test might be narrowed to apply only when an agency 
concludes that state law is preempted.71 
B.   Procedure-Based Approaches 
Other scholarly proposals focus on agency procedures.  The idea here is 
that certain parts of an agency‘s decision-making process can be federalism-
protecting, and that agencies should be induced to engage fully in those 
procedures.  One way to encourage agency compliance with federalism-
friendly procedures is to make such compliance a prerequisite for Chevron 
(or other deference doctrines).  For example, Professor Catherine Sharkey 
has suggested that courts could ―condition[] any deference to an agency‘s 
preemption position on that agency‘s compliance with the strictures of 
Executive Order 13,132,‖ the ―Federalism Executive Order,‖ which 
requires consultation with states.72  She has also suggested that applying 
Skidmore rather than Chevron deference may be a way to ―encourag[e] 
agencies to engage in formal notice-and-comment rulemaking processes 
that, arguably, vet the agency decisionmaking process and make the agency 
respond to substantive concerns raised by all affected parties.‖73  Professor 
Young has made a similar suggestion, proposing that an improved Skidmore 
analysis would consider whether the agency complied with the Federalism 
Executive Order.  Professor Gillian Metzger has observed that there are 
various ways for courts to encourage agencies to adhere to procedures 
geared toward care for state interests.  Among other options, ―courts could 
relax their substantive scrutiny when agencies utilized procedures (whether 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or other measures) intended to ensure 
adequate attention to state interests.‖74 
Here, too, Wyeth lends some support by reflecting concern with agency 
procedure.  The FDA‘s notice of proposed rulemaking had explicitly stated 
that the rule would not have federalism implications or preempt state law; 
the agency later finalized the rule and, without giving states additional 
notice or allowing them to comment, ―articulated a sweeping position on 
 
 69. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 63, at 680–89; Merrill, supra note 18, at 773; 
Sharkey, supra note 64, at 2180. 
 70. See supra note 10. 
 71. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 741 n.14 (citing Howard P. Walthall, Jr., 
Comment, Chevron v. Federalism:  A Reassessment of Deference to Administrative 
Preemption, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 754–58 (1997–98)). 
 72. Sharkey, supra note 64, at 2185; Sharkey, supra note 13, at 256–57. 
 73. Sharkey, supra note 64, at 2185; Sharkey, supra note 60, at 498. 
 74. Metzger, supra note 1, at 2102–03. 
644 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
the [statute‘s] pre-emptive effect in the regulatory preamble.‖75  The 
Court‘s dissatisfaction with the FDA‘s bait and switch was palpable:  ―The 
agency‘s views on state law,‖ the Court stated, ―are inherently suspect in 
light of this procedural failure.‖76  The Court‘s dissatisfaction in one case 
certainly does not establish a doctrinal rule.  Still, it lends some support to 
the proposals that agencies should get less deference when they fail to 
undertake federalism-friendly procedures. 
C.   Substance-Based Approaches 
A third approach to Federalism Step Zero would tailor Chevron‘s 
application based on the particular subject area or statute at issue.  This is a 
cousin of the famously fraught efforts to identify separate spheres of state 
and federal authority as part of a model of ―dual federalism.‖77  And yet the 
substance-based proposals recur.  The reason may be that, although it is 
likely impossible to identify entire subject areas of exclusive state or federal 
authority, it is still the case that the federal balance does not look the same 
in every field, and that some specific issues or tasks, if not categories, have 
usually been handled by one level of government or the other.78 
The Supreme Court‘s Step Zero analysis in Gonzales v. Oregon79 
intimates a subject-based approach—in particular, one that asks whether the 
area is one of ―traditional‖ state authority.  The case involved an 
Interpretive Rule issued by the Attorney General under the Controlled 
Substances Act prohibiting doctors from prescribing drugs for use in 
physician-assisted suicide, a practice permitted in the state of Oregon.80  
The Court found the Chevron framework inapplicable at Step Zero because 
the Attorney General lacked authority to issue the interpretation in 
question—in the language of Mead, he had not acted with the force of 
law.81  One of the Court‘s grounds for this conclusion was concern for ―the 
background principles of our federal system.‖82  The Court concluded that 
the statute, consistent with tradition, presumes that states are the lead 
regulators of medical practice,83 and the Court refused to believe that 
Congress would have used ―an obscure grant of authority to regulate areas 
 
 75. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009). 
 76. Id. 
 77. On the demise of dual federalism, see generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of 
Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent 
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 188 (2001). 
 78. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1485 (―[T]he larger project of preemption 
jurisprudence is to develop area-specific precepts for calibrating the state-federal balance.  
Professor Thomas Merrill is working on such an area-specific project for environmental law.  
Professors Langbein and Macey are moving in that direction for pension and banking law, 
respectively. Professor Catherine Sharkey is thinking along similar lines for federal 
preemption of state product liability law.  Other academics should join this parade.‖). 
 79. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 80. See id. at 249. 
 81. See id. at 268.  The Court commented that the statute would have been ambiguous 
for purposes of Chevron Step One. See id. at 258. 
 82. Id. at 274. 
 83. See id. at 270–71. 
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traditionally supervised by the States‘ police power.‖84  The Court 
characterized this as a ―commonsense conclusion,‖ expressly disavowing 
reliance on the presumption against preemption or clear statement rules.85 
While leaving many questions unanswered, the relevant portion of the 
Court‘s analysis opens the door to a very broad Federalism Step Zero.  In 
effect, the Court pronounced a Step Zero presumption that Congress has not 
given an agency the law-interpreting authority necessary to trigger Chevron 
deference where the delegation intrudes on state prerogatives in traditional 
areas of state police power.86  This doctrine has the potential to reach 
beyond square administrative preemption cases.  After all, although 
Gonzales involved conflict between state and federal law in the colloquial 
sense, it was not a true conflict preemption case in the doctrinal sense,87 and 
the Court did not invoke the presumption against preemption.88  Gonzales 
thus may well stand for a broader approach in which the trigger for shutting 
off Chevron is the incursion of federal agency action into subject areas 
thought to be traditionally state controlled.89 
 
 84. Id. at 274. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Gersen, supra note 1, at 244 (―Read properly as Step Zero analysis, [the key 
passage in Gonzales] indicates that Chevron deference will not generally be given to agency 
interpretations of statutes generating conflicts with state law, at least in fields traditionally of 
state or local concern like the regulation of the medical profession.‖).  Professor Gersen 
interprets Gonzales as creating a ―modified Step Zero presumption against preemption‖ 
under which ―Congress will not be taken to delegate law-interpreting authority when a 
federal agency asserts authority in a way that butts up against traditional state concerns.‖ See 
id. at 245; see also Keller, supra note 9, at 70 & n.129. 
 87. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 290 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Interpretive 
Rule ―does not purport to pre-empt state law in any way, not even by conflict pre-emption—
unless the Court is under the misimpression that some States require assisted suicide[,]‖ but 
―merely interprets the CSA to prohibit, like countless other federal criminal provisions, 
conduct that happens not to be forbidden under state law‖). 
 88. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Gersen, supra note 1, at 247 
(noting that Gonzales‘s ―modified preemption presumption of Step Zero is a close cousin to 
the Rice presumption against preemption, but the Court apparently conceives of them as 
different tools‖). 
 89. Cf. Hills, supra note 10 (referring to the ―Mead-Gonzales doctrine‖ as one that 
requires de novo review when statutes allocate authority to decision makers at multiple 
levels of government).  The litigants in City of Arlington also raised the possibility of a 
subject area–based test for a Federalism Step Zero, noting that the FCC was asserting 
interpretive authority in the area of land use, an area of ―traditional state and local concern.‖ 
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
This approach garnered the interest of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy at oral 
argument.  Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion rejected the proposal, concluding that the case 
did not raise federalism questions at all, because there was no question that federal law 
would control; the only question was whether federal courts or federal agencies would 
decide its meaning. See id.  For disagreement, see Hills, supra note 10 (noting that it is 
―entirely plausible‖ to believe that ―federal judges are likely to be more likely than mission-
bound agency bureaucrats to understand and care about general aspects of our legal culture 
like federalism‖). 
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III.   CRITIQUING A FEDERALISM STEP ZERO 
A Federalism Step Zero imposes costs without adequate benefits.  This 
part first explains why a Federalism Step Zero, operationalized through any 
of the approaches noted above, would be unlikely to serve the federalism 
goals of its proponents.  It then describes the harms that such a test would 
cause related to the Chevron framework itself—by reducing the coherence, 
simplicity, and predictability of the deference regime. 
A.   The Impossibility of a Federalism “Test” 
A first reason to reject a Federalism Step Zero is that it is unlikely to aid 
the federalism cause.  The heterogeneity of federalism questions reveals 
why:  the modes and goals of federalism analysis are too varied for any test 
to accurately predict which cases, if any, will be so unsuitable for deference 
that they should not even be eligible for it.90 
Federalism questions tend to involve diverse subsidiary inquiries, 
including factual and policy inquiries on which agencies likely have 
expertise.91  In addition, the goals of federalism are varied.  When scholars 
talk about federalism values, especially in the administrative context, they 
actually invoke a number of distinct values that will sometimes conflict.92  
As I have written elsewhere, three key goals emerge from the administrative 
federalism literature‘s desire to protect federalism in the administrative 
process.  The most prominent goal is the protection of state autonomy or 
state power.93  But courts and commentators also emphasize at least two 
other goals:  learning from, and making good decisions based on, states‘ 
knowledge and information, and following the will of state citizens.94  
There is no single federalism rule or norm that can be coherently abstracted 
from these multiple values and imported into the Step Zero framework, 
much less a test that could predict when and on which goals agencies (or 
 
 90. There is, of course, no agreed upon baseline for the desired extent of protection of 
federalism values.  The assertion here is thus comparative:  federalism values, as defined 
here, will likely be no better off if federal questions are intercepted by courts at Step Zero 
than if they are evaluated in the ordinary Chevron framework. 
 91. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009); Merrill, supra note 11, at 
779; Sharkey, supra note 20, at 107.  One way to incorporate the expertise of both agencies 
and courts is to apply lesser Skidmore deference to federalism questions, a proposal favored 
by several of the scholars mentioned in this Essay.  But as discussed below, the very project 
of identifying which cases ought to be carved out for analysis under Skidmore rather than 
Chevron is likely to be ineffective and burdensome, and carving out broad exceptions from 
Chevron-eligibility would harm the doctrine‘s coherence and predictability.  Because 
Chevron itself leverages the competence of both courts and agencies, the carve-out is hard to 
justify. 
 92. See Seifter, supra note 22, at 957.  Relatedly, scholars have recognized that there are 
a number of different overarching definitions and accounts of federalism. See, e.g., Akhil 
Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism:  “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1229 (1994); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Unbundling Federalism:  Colorado’s Legalization of 
Marijuana and Federalism’s Many Forms, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2014). 
 93. See Seifter, supra note 22, at 980–81. 
 94. See id. at 957. 
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courts) will underperform.95  Federalism‘s moving parts need to be 
evaluated holistically and weighed in context. 
In turn, each of the three approaches to a Federalism Step Zero described 
in Part II is doomed to fail.  Each test will produce inaccuracies, stripping 
cases of deference-eligibility even where federalism values are not 
threatened or where agencies are well-equipped to perform the analysis. 
1.   The Categorical Approach 
Recall that the first and most popular option has been a category-based 
approach, which would deny Chevron analysis in preemption cases or 
another easily identifiable subset of cases with federalism implications.96  
This approach would impose some neatness; it would be relatively easy to 
determine whether the case falls within the category.  But it is an inaccurate 
gauge for detecting when an agency might mishandle a federalism question. 
As alluded to already, preemption questions, like other federalism 
questions, are often rooted in factual and policy questions on which 
agencies have substantial expertise.97  Categorically carving these cases out 
of the Chevron framework thus risks denying deference in cases where its 
traditional justifications are strongest. 
Perhaps less obviously, selecting only preemption cases for exclusion 
from the Chevron framework is also somewhat arbitrary.  First, as Professor 
Gillian Metzger has pointed out, withholding deference for statutory 
interpretations that would preempt state law misses the fact that agencies 
can also (or effectively) preempt through legislative rules that do not 
directly address the statute‘s preemptive scope.98  Furthermore, preemption 
is but a slice of the many ways in which federal agencies can substantially 
limit states‘ autonomy and discretion.  Funding decisions, and conditions on 
funding, can also invade state prerogatives in powerful ways.  So can the 
huge category of rules that eliminate some swath of state discretion without 
directly preempting state law.  Indeed, some of these alternative constraints 
on state power may be more pernicious from a federalism perspective than 
ordinary preemption.99  Focusing exclusively on cases that fall within 
preemption doctrines misses some of the most potent and pervasive 
 
 95. Cf. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2040 (2009) (identifying difficulties with an 
abstract federalism norm as a constitutional matter). 
 96. See supra Part II.B. 
 97. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 11, at 779; Sharkey, supra note 20, at 107. 
 98. Metzger, supra note 1, at 2071.  Professor Merrill has proposed mitigating this 
inconsistency by applying a sui generis standard of review in preemption cases that would 
apply not only to agencies‘ legal conclusions regarding preemption, but also to other agency 
interpretations that effectively preempt state law. See Merrill, supra note 11, at 773–76.  This 
would limit some potential manipulation, but it would not address the broader problem of 
non-preemption cases that infringe federalism norms. 
 99. After all, federalism is sometimes served by the imposition of a uniform national 
solution. Cf. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism:  A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010).  It is harder to make the case 
that federalism is served by underfunding federal programs or constraining state officials‘ 
discretion in ways that make it difficult for them to do their jobs. 
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infringements on state prerogatives while also denying deference where it is 
justified. 
2.   Procedure-Based Approaches 
The second possible approach to a Federalism Step Zero, hinging 
eligibility for deference on an agency‘s use of federalism-friendly 
procedures, is also flawed.  There is no agency procedure that reliably 
defends, or even tracks, the suite of federalism goals sought by most 
federalism proponents.100 
The most prominent federalism-friendly agency procedure is consultation 
with states.  In prior work, I revealed that these consultations most often 
occur with state interest groups, organizations of state officials that lobby 
on behalf of state interests.101  Indeed, both formal legal instruments and 
longstanding administrative practice bless the involvement of state interest 
groups in agency decision making.  Yet state interest groups, my prior work 
concluded, tend to serve one federalism goal while undermining others—
state interest group consultations usually yield pleas for state autonomy, but 
they tend to disserve the goals of enhancing agency expertise with states‘ 
substantive experiences and protecting the interests of state citizens. 
This imbalance occurs because of the mission and structure of state 
interest groups.  The purpose of the groups is to focus states on their 
common ground.  To be effective as lobbyists, the groups focus their 
advocacy on single positions.  This means (seemingly ironically for 
federalism) that the groups downplay states‘ differences and diversity, and 
do not serve as conduits for states‘ substantive information and experiences.  
Moreover, because of the way that the groups are governed—for example, 
not all states are usually members, unanimity is not required, and many 
state members do not engage in most votes—a ―group‖ position often does 
not reflect the views of all state official members, let alone state citizens.102 
Nor does consulting with states individually rather than with state interest 
groups necessarily serve all federalism goals.  Individual consultations 
produce the opposite tradeoff:  state officials readily convey their 
substantive experiences and the preferences of their citizens, but they have 
many reasons not to value state autonomy.103  As I and others have noted 
elsewhere, state officials have numerous reasons—ideology, political needs, 
fiscal concerns, personal gain, and more—to depart from the federal 
structure.104  They may well lobby for a new federal rule or the expansion 
 
 100. As the discussion suggests, I take as given that the majority of federalism proponents 
have nuanced goals related to state autonomy, expertise, and democratic accountability, 
rather than a singular focus on any one facet of federalism. 
 101. For more on state interest groups and their role in the federal regulatory process, see 
generally Seifter, supra note 22, at 961–79. 
 102. See id. at 1001–02. 
 103. See id. at 982–83. 
 104. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (noting that ―powerful 
incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal 
structure to be in their personal interests‖); Seifter, supra note 22, at 982–83 & n.128 
(collecting sources). 
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of federal programs even where the optimal outcome for the federal 
structure is the protection of state autonomy. 
Because there is no ideal procedure for defending the goals of federalism 
proponents, denying deference where agencies fail to follow particular 
procedures for state input may be unhelpful or even counterproductive for 
federalism purposes.105 
3.   Substance-Based Approaches 
The third approach to a Federalism Step Zero would hinge Chevron-
eligibility on the subject matter or statute at issue, with the idea that some 
areas are traditionally reserved for state governance.  This approach is well-
known for its futility.106  As federalism scholars have recognized (through 
metaphors of ―marble cake‖ and others), state and federal governance are so 
intertwined that it is impossible to identify any areas of exclusive state or 
federal control.107  Even ―traditionally‖ state areas like policing or 
―traditionally‖ federal areas like foreign affairs have substantial state and 
federal involvement.108  It may be possible to say in a given case that the 
specific question at issue has been historically controlled by the states or the 
federal government, but that helps only if the courts take a case-by-case 
approach—the very approach that won‘t work at Step Zero. 
One potential response to this Essay‘s critique of the available 
approaches to a Federalism Step Zero is that its logic has no stopping point.  
If federalism cannot be distilled to a simple inquiry, must we also abolish 
the longstanding federalism canons?109  Such a response might posit that 
some inaccuracy is acceptable, even inevitable, in statutory interpretation, 
such that both the federalism canons and a potential Federalism Step Zero 
are saved.  This response has some merit, but should not prevail.  One reply 
is that federalism canons can be and are applied selectively, when judges 
find that the circumstances warrant their use.110  This inconsistency is not 
 
 105. I have argued elsewhere that agencies should be required to consult with individual 
states in addition to state interest groups to satisfy the Federalism Executive Order. See 
Seifter, supra note 22, at 1021–22.  If that requirement were adopted, a procedure-based test 
for federalism compliance would work better.  Still, this is a second-best solution compared 
to the avenues for more encompassing reasonableness analysis in Chevron‘s interior steps 
and arbitrary and capricious review. 
 106. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 507, 515 (2008) (―[T]he category of traditional arenas of state regulation is so 
subject to manipulation that almost any state law or regulation could be characterized as 
falling or not falling within a traditional arena.‖). 
 107. E.g., Morton Grodzins, The Federal System, in AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS 54, 54 (Laurence J. O‘Toole, Jr. ed., 4th ed. 2007) (explaining that federalism is 
more of a ―marble cake‖ than a ―layer cake‖). 
 108. See, e.g., id. at 54–57. 
 109. See generally, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
621, 665 (1990) (―Federalism canons are rules of construction based upon the nation‘s 
federal system of government, with its division of responsibilities among national, state, and 
local governments.‖). 
 110. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 
(1950). 
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suitable for Step Zero, where waffling could destabilize or even unravel 
Chevron.  Nor is it something to strive for; federalism canons, particularly 
the presumption against preemption, are oft-criticized for their inconsistent 
and even opportunistic application.111  More importantly, canons are 
applied contextually.  They are weighed against other canons and the facts 
and circumstances of the case to reach an answer.  This is the sort of 
analysis that is possible in the reasonableness inquiries of Chevron and 
arbitrary and capricious review.  A Federalism Step Zero, in contrast, would 
be an on-off switch, shutting off the necessary contextual analysis regarding 
the federalism values at stake and the propriety of agency deference. 
B.   Chevron-Related Harms 
Another set of costs arising from a Federalism Step Zero relates to the 
Chevron framework itself.  First, adding a federalism inquiry to the pre-
Chevron analysis would make the analysis more complex and less 
coherent.112  A key feature of Chevron is its creation of a simple, broad 
presumption in favor of agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities.113  
Particular agency decisions may be unreasonable and undeserving of 
deference, but that is a problem that can be handled within Chevron‘s 
interior steps.114  Creating exceptions to Chevron‘s application—and if the 
Court did so for federalism, it would make little sense not to do so for other 
issues as well—undermines the coherence and predictability of the 
deference regime. 
As noted, prioritizing the importance of coherence and clarity in Chevron 
analysis entails some limit on efforts to tailor Chevron‘s application to the 
variety of congressional intent, a development City of Arlington appears to 
support.115  The federalism context reflects the sensibility of this limitation, 
for it would be a particularly thorny area in which to develop new doctrines 
to match Congress‘s unstated intentions.  The recent, pathbreaking 
empirical study by Professors Lisa Bressman and Abbe Gluck illuminated 
that legislative drafters had a range of intentions regarding delegation to 
 
 111. See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism:  A Revisionist 
Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 754 (2013) (―In the most charitable light, it might be said 
that the Court‘s preemption jurisprudence responds to individual policy considerations and 
circumstantial detail.  More skeptically, it might be posited that the latter jurisprudence is to 
date wanting in guiding principles.‖); Sharkey, supra note 60, at 458 (―I join a veritable 
chorus of scholars pointing out the Court‘s haphazard application of the presumption.‖). 
 112. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 
(2013) (No. 11-1545) (Solicitor General Verrilli arguing that adding jurisdictional questions 
into the Step Zero inquiry would give it ―the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code‖). 
 113. See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 191–92; Vermeule, supra note 25, at 348 (―[T]he key 
innovation of Chevron is to create a global interpretive presumption:  ambiguities are, 
without more, taken to signify implicit delegations of interpretive authority to the 
administering agency.‖). 
 114. See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 194. 
 115. For a summary of competing views regarding the legal fiction of congressional 
intent on which Chevron rests, see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal 
Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009 (2011). 
2014] FEDERALISM AT STEP ZERO 651 
agencies for different types of questions that implicated federalism.116  
Approximately 70 percent of the surveyed drafters indicated that they 
intended agencies to fill gaps regarding the division of labor between states 
and federal agencies, while approximately 36 percent said that they 
intended agencies to fill gaps regarding preemption.117  Attempting to track 
Congress‘s fine-grained, unspoken, and likely shifting preferences could 
produce doctrinal chaos.  City of Arlington‘s bright-line rule, in contrast, 
provides a default against which Congress can legislate.  This sort of 
congressional engagement does not seem far-fetched given recent evidence 
that Congress is aware of Chevron.  Professor Kent Barnett has highlighted 
a recent instance—the Dodd-Frank Act—in which Congress answered the 
Step Zero question expressly, suggesting that Congress may use Chevron as 
a default principle when drafting legislation and knows how to select a 
different rule when it so desires.118 
There is also the risk that judicial administration of the Federalism Step 
Zero itself would be a muddle.  I have argued that a Federalism Step Zero 
would have to be a bright-line test, but as the foregoing discussion points 
out, even the best options for such a test would not always be bright.  A test 
based on subject area, in particular, would be hopelessly difficult to apply.  
If the new Step Zero itself is unclear, the result would be a repeat of Mead:  
unpredictability for courts and litigants, and inconsistent results. 
The stakes of this debate extend beyond the federalism topics discussed 
in this Essay.  Scholars have debated other potential exceptions to 
Chevron‘s application, all of which are properly understood as Step Zero 
debates.  One debate has considered whether certain substantive canons of 
construction ―trump‖ Chevron.119  Another possible exception would carve 
certain ―major‖ questions out of Chevron‘s domain, on the assumption that 
Congress would not have intended to allow agencies to decide matters of 
such importance.120  Yet another debate—resolved in City of Arlington—
had surrounded whether agencies‘ interpretations of their own ―jurisdiction‖ 
(or statutory authority) were eligible for deference under Chevron.121  In 
 
 116. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 39, at 994–95. 
 117. See id. at 1004–05 & fig.11. 
 118. See Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with Chevmore 
Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014); Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405016.  
Professor Barnett ultimately concludes that Mead, rather than City of Arlington, provides the 
better default rule. See id. 
 119. While some courts and commentators have suggested that the canons trump 
Chevron, see, for example, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & 
Constuction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 330, 
others have suggested that Chevron should trump the canons, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
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11 (2006); Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of 
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Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 111 (2008). 
 120. See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 231–47. 
 121. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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each of these areas, expanding Step Zero threatens harm to the Chevron 
framework, and the question must be whether the benefits justify that harm. 
C.   A Better Way:  Reasonableness and State Interests 
I have argued so far that a Federalism Step Zero is ill-advised because the 
test would likely mark no improvement for achieving federalism goals and 
would impose significant costs on the Chevron framework.  None of this is 
to say that federalism is irrelevant to the question whether courts should 
defer to particular agency decisions, or that there ought to be no means of 
reining in poor agency judgments.  Quite the contrary:  in some cases, 
issues of state-federal balance, or agencies‘ engagement or failure to engage 
with interested state participants, can usefully inform whether agency 
interpretations should be controlling.  And agency decisions can be policed 
through a flexible inquiry into reasonableness—an inquiry possible within 
the Chevron analysis, and in arbitrary and capricious review—rather than at 
the simple, light-touch inquiry of Step Zero.  Considering federalism at 
these phases of the analysis would more sensibly achieve the goals of 
federalism proponents, at much less cost to Chevron. 
Both Chevron‘s interior steps and arbitrary and capricious review afford 
the flexibility and holistic evaluation necessary to consider, in context, 
whether and how an agency decision affects federalism values.122  Arbitrary 
and capricious review, sometimes nicknamed ―hard look‖ review, allows 
courts to ask whether an agency‘s decision was adequately explained, 
taking into account all relevant factors.123  Chevron‘s interior steps, 
particularly Chevron‘s Step Two, address the reasonableness or 
permissibility of an agency‘s decision with reference to what Congress has 
commanded.124  These are appropriate points at which to consider whether 
the agency‘s action or interpretation is sufficiently consistent with the 
federal structure.  In undertaking that analysis, a court can consider the 
subject matter, the agency‘s procedures, and the category of action at issue, 
as well as other relevant factors, without being boxed in by an artificial rule. 
 
 122. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating that the Court 
performs the same analysis at Chevron‘s Step Two and in arbitrary and capricious review, 
asking ―whether an agency interpretation is ‗arbitrary or capricious in substance‘‖ (quoting 
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011))). 
 123. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–
49 (1983); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
586 (1985); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2009). 
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95 VA. L. REV. 611, 612 (2009). See also Richard Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 
IND. L.J. 605 (2014). 
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Take the example of Gonzales.125  The federalism portion of that case‘s 
analysis could well have been applied at Step Two, or in arbitrary and 
capricious review, rather than Step Zero.  Under this alternative approach, 
the court still could have rejected the Attorney General‘s interpretive rule, 
but it could have done so in a way that preserved the existing Chevron 
framework rather than creating a confusing new test that would sweep in 
cases where there is no federalism threat.126  The Court could have deemed 
the Attorney General‘s interpretation unreasonable in light of the specific 
circumstances:  this particular decision looked like an overreach, in part 
because of the subject matter at issue, in part because of the agency‘s 
inconsiderate procedures (Attorney General Ashcroft denied the Oregon 
Attorney General‘s request for a meeting and indicated that the Department 
of Justice was not planning to revisit its then-existing interpretation 
regarding physician-assisted suicide), and in part because of the ―category‖ 
of case at issue (while it was not a doctrinal preemption case, the 
interpretive rule would have displaced a state law).  The Court would have 
reached this conclusion without creating a puzzling new ―Gonzales 
doctrine‖ that would carve out subsequent subject-area cases from Chevron 
analysis.  A Step Two analysis would have left open the possibility that 
some agency decisions, even in similar areas, warranted deference as 
authorized and reasonable statutory interpretations. 
This resolution is in harmony with other proposals for contextual 
evaluation of an agency‘s treatment of federalism issues.  Professor Gillian 
Metzger has suggested that courts should hold agencies to ―a greater burden 
of persuasion and explanation‖ under arbitrary and capricious review when 
agency actions ―substantially restrict state experimentation and traditional 
state functions.‖127  She suggests that this be applied as a ―contextual 
approach,‖ such that greater justification is not a rigid requirement, but is 
demanded where the circumstances warrant it.128  Professors Brian Galle 
and Mark Seidenfeld have proposed ―an amalgam of Skidmore and hard 
look review‖ for agency decisions displacing state power, which would 
consider a variety of federalism-related factors.129  This Essay‘s proposal to 
consider federalism values at Step Two and in arbitrary and capricious 
review also resonates with Professor Kenneth Bamberger‘s suggestion to 
 
 125. See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
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consider ―normative canons‖ of statutory interpretation, including 
federalism canons, at Chevron‘s Step Two.130 
Unlike the expansion of Step Zero, there is little cost to considering 
federalism among the factors that affect the reasonableness of an agency‘s 
decision.  There is no reason to believe that the levers within the Chevron 
framework and arbitrary and capricious review will be unable to weed out 
those instances in which agency interpretations misconceive federalism 
values or reveal insufficient expertise, inadequate procedures, or the like.  
Nor do the flexibility of arbitrary and capricious review and the Step Two 
inquiry, which are already central to administrative law, substantially harm 
judicial administration or Chevron‘s stability. 
CONCLUSION 
Numerous proposals at the intersection of administrative law and 
federalism belong under the rubric of a Federalism Step Zero.  These 
proposals generally seek to carve federalism questions out of Chevron‘s 
domain in order to better protect the values associated with the federal 
structure.  But Step Zero must be (and apparently now is) a simple inquiry 
based on bright-line rules, while federalism analysis is not susceptible to 
any bright-line tests.  In Chevron and beyond, federalism is best analyzed 
with standards rather than rules.  The multiple goals and issues that 
federalism questions entail prevent any neat interception of questions 
unsuitable for agency deference, and suggest that agencies have as much to 
offer in many federalism cases as they do in other Chevron-eligible realms.  
Agencies will not be perfect at such tasks, but the restraints within the 
Chevron framework leave plenty of room to rein in bad agency decision 
making.  When it comes to protecting federalism values, two steps of 
Chevron are enough. 
 
 
 130. See generally Bamberger, supra note 119. 
